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Abstract  
 
Industrialized countries are often required to make unpopular policy choices in 
order to efficiently tackle climate change. On the one hand, domestic industries 
might consider national climate measures as an excessive burden that may 
damage their competitiveness. On the other hand, the public may not be willing 
to pay a higher price for climate friendly products. Furthermore, an obstacle 
may arise from other international legal regimes whose goals may be 
undermined by domestic climate measures. In this paper I will examine this last 
possibility. In particular, I will assess whether the international trade regime may 
constitute an obstacle for future domestic climate measures. An affirmative or 
negative conclusion will be drawn after having answered three crucial 
questions.        
First, have domestic climate measures already clashed with trade 
regimes? In 2001 the problematic relationship between a taxation scheme 
adopted by Finland to improve energy efficiency and EC rules on the free 
movement goods highlighted this possibility.        
Second, are taxation schemes still being used in order to tackle climate 
change? Current climate policies show that not only are taxes being established, 
but that measures based on border tax adjustments are also being taken into 
consideration for the future.       
Third, are climate taxes WTO compatible? The discussion of this point 
will involve an analysis of those WTO rules with which the domestic climate 
measures may come into conflict and the environmental exceptions that could 
be applied to the climate taxation schemes.       
Although trade regimes should not constitute an obstacle for domestic 
climate measures, as the EU example demonstrates, this is not always the case. 
Therefore, proposals able to combine the goals of the two regimes must be put 
forth in order to prevent the WTO from being considered another obstacle for 
efficient domestic climate policies. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Industrialized countries are often required to make unpopular policy choices in 
order to efficiently tackle climate change. On the one hand, domestic industries 
might consider national climate measures as an excessive burden that may 
damage their competitiveness. On the other hand, consumers may not be 
willing to pay a higher price for climate friendly products. Furthermore, an 
obstacle may arise from other international legal regimes whose goals may be 
undermined by domestic climate measures. This paper looks at this last 
possibility and, in particular, it assesses whether the international trade regime 
may constitute an obstacle for future domestic climate measures,1 focusing the 
analysis on climate-related taxes.2
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1  It is interesting to see whether domestic climate measures have already clashed with 
trade regimes. The answer is positive and one can look at the European Union for an example. 
In 2001 the difficult relationship between a taxation scheme adopted by Finland to improve 
energy efficiency and EC rules on the free movement of goods highlighted this possibility. See 
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For the purposes of this paper, climate taxes will be divided into three 
categories. First, they can focus on a specific product that is relatively 
dangerous for the climate. This will be the case of a tax on energy products in 
which specific non-environmentally friendly raw materials such as oil or coal will 
be more heavily taxed than others such as gas. Throughout the paper this kind 
of measure will be referred to as a feedstock tax. Second, climate taxes can 
focus on the way a product has been produced. This will be the case for 
example of a tax on tiles based on the kind of energy that has been used in 
their process or production method (PPM). This kind of measure will be called a 
PPM tax. Finally, a third kind of climate tax can focus on the energy efficiency of 
a product. In this last case the tax will depend neither on the product itself, nor 
on the way it has been produced, but on its environmentally friendly, or 
unfriendly, impact throughout its lifetime. I will refer to this kind of measure as 
an efficiency tax. 
 The paper will be divided into two main parts. The first will assess the 
compatibility of climate taxes with the multilateral trading system. The study of 
the WTO rules on internal taxation provided for in GATT article III, and the study 
of the concepts of likeness and direct competitiveness and substitutability 
inherently contained in it , lead to the general conclusion that in most cases 
climate taxes will be considered a prima facie violation of the national treatment 
principle. The second part of the paper will consider whether the three kinds of 
climate taxes can be saved under the general exceptions provided for in GATT 
article XX. The study of the content and of the application of the three climate 
taxes will lead to slightly different considerations in each case. Finally, the legal 
conclusions will lead to a number of policy recommendations whose goal is to 
bridge the current gap between climate taxes and the multilateral trading 
system. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Finland’s Fourth National Communication under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, 2006, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/finnc4.pdf, p. 101: 
“In 2001, Finland decided to lower taxation of imported used vehicles because of a decision of 
the European Court of Justice, as the European Communities considered the taxation in Finland 
was discriminatory from the point of view of free movement of goods within the European 
Union.” 
2  Climate taxes are part of the wider family of environmental taxes. The rational behind 
these instruments is one of the reasons for their success. Environmental taxes apply the polluter 
pay principle according to which the burden of environmental degradation should be taken by 
whoever is responsible for it; see G. Goh, “The World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy 
Tax Adjustments at the Border”, Journal of World Trade (2004) 38 (3), pp. 395-423, p. 397. For 
more information on environmental taxes see O.K. Fauchald, Environmental Taxes and Trade 
Discrimination: London-The Hague-Boston; Kluwer Law International (1998), pp. 30-33. 
Switching to climate taxes, the ratio behind them is to put pressure on those who are more 
directly responsible for climate change. However, climate taxes are usually not adopted upon 
production but at consumption, in which case the final effect of the climate tax is a price 
increase of the final product and consumers will be affected by the tax. For more information on 
climate taxes and further possible classifications see Kommerskollegium, Climate and Trade 
Rules - Harmony or Conflict? (2004), pp. 107; available at 
 http://www.kommers.se/binaries/attachments/3430_Climate%20and%20Trade%20Rules.pdf, 
pp. 22-23; and S. Charnovitz, “Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies”, Pew 
Centre on Global Climate Change Working Draft (2003), pp. 32; available at 
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 http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Beyond_Kyoto_Trade.pdf, pp. 5-6.  
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2. Are climate taxes WTO compatible? 
 
The WTO rule that most directly relates to internal taxation is GATT article III, 
which establishes the national treatment principle according to which States 
must give imported products, once they have cleared customs, the same 
treatment given to domestic like products.3 The provision that deals with internal 
taxation reads as follows: 
 
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other 
internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations 
requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified 
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.4
 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in 
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic 
products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise apply 
internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic 
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1.5
 
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of 
paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the 
provisions of the second sentence only in cases where competition 
was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed product and, on 
the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product which 
was not similarly taxed.6
 
WTO rules on internal taxation distinguish between like products and 
directly competitive and substitutable products. 7  The difference is important 
                                                 
3  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), Appellate 
Body Report (Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, 4 October 1996), section F: “The broad and fundamental 
purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory 
measures.” GATT Article III:2 resembles very closely EC Treaty Article 90. See on this point 
M.M. Slotboom, “Do Different Treaty Purposes Matter for Treaty Interpretation? The 
elimination of Discriminatory Internal Taxes in EC and WTO law”, 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law (2001), pp. 557-579. 
4  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Article III:1, in The Legal Texts: The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press (1999) p. 427. Hereinafter The Legal Texts. 
5  Ibid, art. III:2 in The Legal Texts, p. 427. 
6  Ibid, note ad art. III:2 in The Legal Texts, p. 479-480. 
 4
7  The latter are a sub-group of like products according to Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), Panel Report (Doc. WT/DS8/R, 11 July 1996), § 
6.22. 
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because if a domestic and an imported product are like products, and the 
imported one has been subject to a higher tax than the domestic product, then 
the tax will be a violation of the national treatment principle and it will be non-
compatible with WTO law.8 On the other hand, if a domestic and an imported 
product are directly competitive or substitutable, and the imported one has been 
subject to a higher tax than the domestic product, then the tax will not be per se 
a violation of the national treatment principle and it will not be automatically non-
compatible with WTO law. In this case a third condition must be fulfilled in order 
to finally condemn a tax of this kind: the tax must have been applied so as to 
afford protection to the domestic product.9
 
2.1. Like products vs. directly competitive or substitutable products 
 
Therefore, in relation to the WTO compatibility of climate taxes the first issue 
that must be raised is whether the products that are being taxed differently are 
like products or directly competitive or substitutable products. It is evident that a 
State that has applied a climate tax will try to prove that they fall within the 
second category.  
 How does one decide whether two products are like or just directly 
competitive or substitutable? WTO case law has repeatedly used four main 
criteria to determine the concept of likeness:  
 
• physical properties,   
• end uses,   
• consumer’s preferences and  
• tariff classification.10 
 
Physical properties are the first element that must be taken into 
consideration. The closer the physical characteristics of two products, the most 
likely is it that they will be considered like products.11 The second criterion used 
to determine the likeness of two products is end uses. If two products satisfy the 
same demand in a specific market they will have the same end uses and the 
                                                 
8  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Appellate Body Report, section H.1. 
9  Ibid, section H.2. 
10  Report of the Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 (Doc. L/3464), § 18: “The 
Working Party concluded that problems arising from the interpretation of the term should be 
examined on a case-by-case basis. This would allow a fair assessment in each case of the 
different elements that constitute a "similar" product. Some criteria were suggested for 
determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a product is "similar": the product's end-uses in a 
given market; consumer’s tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the 
product's properties, nature and quality. It was observed, however, that the term "... like or 
similar products ..." caused some uncertainty and that it would be desirable to improve on it; 
however, no improved term was arrived at.” See also on this point European Communities - 
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), Appellate 
Body Report (Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R, 12 March 2001), § 101. 
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11  In the GATT period physical properties were considered to be crucial at the moment of 
determining whether two products were like. In the Tuna – Dolphin cases the Panel strongly 
underlined that in a likeness exam tuna as a product had to be compared to another tuna in 
relation to its physical properties and not taking into account the way the tuna had been caught. 
The latter was insignificant to the likeness exam. See United States - Restrictions on imports of 
tuna (Doc. DS21/R, 3 September 1991), § 5.15. 
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two goods will be like products.12 The third criterion is consumer’s preferences. 
If a consumer will choose either one to satisfy his/her specific demand, the two 
products will be similar according to the consumer’s preferences and they will 
be seen as like products. Finally, the fourth criterion is tariff classification. If two 
products share the same, according to the World Customs Organization’s 
Harmonized System, the two products will be like products. 
 The only difference between like products and directly competitive or 
substitutable products in relation to internal taxation is that the former respond 
to all four criteria, while the latter will not have exactly the same physical 
properties.13 In other words, two products that share the same end-uses and 
are considered similar by the consumers but do not share the same physical 
properties will not be like products, but they will be directly competitive or 
substitutable.  
 
2.2 The nature of the tax 
 
Once two products have been declared in one way or another, the following 
step will be to look at the nature of the tax. In the case of like products it will be 
quite easy to determine whether the tax violates article III because even the 
slightest difference in the taxation of the two like products amounts to a WTO 
non-compatible measure.14 On the other hand, if the two products are directly 
competitive or substitutable, two other conditions must be met before asserting 
the WTO non-compatibility of the measure: the tax to which the imported 
product is subject must be different than the one on the domestic product and it 
must afford protection to the domestic product. 
The first condition implies that a slightly higher tax on imported products 
may not be sufficient to consider it a violation of article III.15 The threshold over 
which the difference in the two taxes becomes a violation has not been clearly 
established by case law, since it has only maintained that the burden on 
imported products must be more than “de minimis in any given case”.16  
The second condition that must be met is that the final effect of the tax 
must be to afford protection to the domestic product. Current case law has 
indicated that if the difference in taxation responds to a need of the policy 
objective to which the tax measure is linked, this must not be taken into account 
by Panels or the Appellate Body. The WTO is not interested in why a tax 
measure has been taken, but in how it has been applied.17 Therefore, the goal 
                                                 
12  End uses are demonstrated by elasticity of substitution, which implies that they satisfy 
the same demand; see Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Panel Report, § 6.22. 
13  On the difference between like products and directly competitive and substitutable 
products see ibid, § 6.22. 
14  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Appellate Body Report, Section H.1.b). 
15  Ibid, section H.2.b). 
16  However, the de minimis threshold has not been specified by the WTO jurisprudence; 
see Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Panel Report, note 118, confirmed in Canada - Certain 
Measures Concerning Periodicals, (Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R, 30 June 1997), Appellate Body 
Report, section VI.B.2. 
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17  There has been a moment at the end of the GATT period, and at the beginning of the 
WTO, in which the policy objective of a specific measure seemed to be important within the 
likeness criteria exam. According to the so called aim and effect test, one of the criteria to 
determine whether two goods were like products would have been precisely the reason behind 
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of the analysis will be to see whether the application of the tax measure 
(regardless of its objective, be it environmental, social or to increase revenue) 
has led to the protection of domestic products. How can one assess this? Case 
law has suggested that “the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure 
of a [tax] measure” may guide Panels and the Appellate Body in the assessment 
of the protectionist nature of a specific tax measure.18
 Summarizing the WTO regulation of internal taxation and linking it to the 
WTO compatibility of the three kinds of climate taxes that have been previously 
underlined, the following steps must be taken: 
1) Are the two products that are being compared (energy products, 
products produced with different energy sources and products with different 
energy efficiency) like products or directly competitive or substitutable products? 
The analysis of their physical properties, their end uses, the study of the 
consumer preferences and their tariff classification will give us an answer. 
2) If they are like products, one must assess whether the imported product 
is subject to a higher tax than the domestic product. If that is the case, the 
climate tax will be a prima facie violation of GATT article III. 
3) If they are directly competitive or substitutable products, one must see, 
on the one hand, whether the imported product is subject to a different tax than 
the domestic product. A slighter higher tax will not be sufficient to prove that the 
measure is WTO incompatible; a de minimis difference in the burden upon the 
imported product must be proven. On the other hand, one must also see 
whether the tax on imported products is applied in a way that gives protection to 
domestic products. The analysis of the design, structure and architecture of the 
measure will reveal the protectionist nature of the tax. If both conditions are met 
in relation to directly competitive or substitutable products, then even in this 
case a prima facie violation of GATT Article III will be assessed.  
Now the paper will move on to see whether the climate taxes that have 
been previously identified deal with like products or directly competitive or 
substitutable products. 
 
2.3. Taxes on energy products (feedstock tax) 
 
Taxes on energy products are levied on different kinds of energy-related raw 
materials. Current efforts to tackle climate change will lead to establish or 
                                                                                                                                               
the less favorable treatment given to one of the two products. Within the context of GATT 
article III:4, which deals with domestic regulations and not fiscal measures, if discrimination 
was due to the fulfillment of a legitimate non-commercial objective, then the two products 
would not be like and less favorable treatment would be allowed; otherwise, the two products 
would be like and less favorable treatment would amount to a violation of the national treatment. 
See United States — Taxes on automobiles (US – Automobiles), Panel Report (Doc. DS31/R, 11 
October 1994), § 5.9: “However, the first step of determining the relevant features common to 
the domestic and imported products (likeness) would in the view of the Panel, in all but the 
most straightforward cases, have to include an examination of the aim and effect of the 
particular tax measure… The Panel concluded that its interpretation was consistent with 
previous ones, but made explicit that issues of likeness under Article III should be analyzed 
primarily in terms of whether less favourable treatment was based on a regulatory distinction 
taken so as to afford protection to domestic production.”  
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18  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Appellate Body Report, section H.2.c). 
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consolidate the setting of higher taxes on non-environmentally friendly sources, 
such as oil or coal, and lower taxes on greener energy sources, such as gas.19  
 In order to assess their WTO-compatibility, the first question is whether 
oil and gas, for example, are like products or directly competitive or 
substitutable products. The examination of the four criterions of the likeness test 
must be carried out. End uses must be assessed in the marketplace through the 
criterion of elasticity of substitution. 20  If both products can fulfill the same 
demand for consumers, then the two products will have the same end uses. 
This is clearly the case for oil and gas. A second criterion to determine the 
likeness of two products is consumer preferences. Do consumers react 
differently to oil or gas as an energy source? One should take into account that 
this must be a case by case assessment and that it is therefore very difficult to 
generalize. Even in those countries in which consumers are very concerned 
about environmental factors it is fair to say that, as far as primary energy 
sources are concerned, consumers still do not clearly distinguish the two 
products. One must then look at the crucial element at the moment of 
determining the likeness of two products: physical properties. According to this 
criterion, oil and coal are not like because they do not share similar physical 
properties. The final criterion, tariff classification is a supplementary criterion 
that may help when the others fail to give a clear answer. In the case of energy 
products there is no uniformity of tariff classification and, therefore, they do not 
meet this requirement.  
In sum, energy products only share the same end uses. In fact, 
consumers do not seem to consider them similarly, they do not have the same 
physical properties nor do they meet the tariff classification requirement. Oil and 
coal are, therefore, directly competitive or substitutable products.21
 
Table 1. Analysis of likeness for taxes on energy products 
Oil / Gas directly competitive or substitutable 
products 
End uses 9 
Consumer preferences X/9 
Physical properties X 
Tariff classification X 
 
Once the nature of the energy products has been established, two further 
questions must be posed in order to ascertain whether the tax on energy 
products is WTO-compatible. On the one hand, the difference in taxation will not 
be a crucial element as in the case of two like products. In fact, two directly 
competitive or substitutable products, such as energy products, can be taxed 
differently without this leading automatically to a WTO violation. The tax will be 
deemed non compatible with the multilateral trade regime only if a de minimis 
difference in the burden of the tax on the imported product is proven. On the 
other hand, one must also see whether the tax on imported products is applied 
                                                 
19  A in depth study of the WTO compatibility of taxes on energy products has been carried 
out by S. Zarrilli, “Domestic Taxation of Energy Products and Multilateral Trade Rules: Is This 
a Case of Unlawful Discrimination?”, 37.2 Journal of World Trade (2003), pp. 359-394. 
20  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Panel Report, § 6.22. 
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21  See S. Zarrilli, above n. 19, p. 379. 
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in a way that gives protection to domestic products. This is precisely where 
current taxes on energy products may fail.22 In fact, the analysis of the inherent 
structure of a tax reveals in many cases the protectionist nature of the measure. 
  
2.4. Taxes based on the energy used in the process or production method 
(PPM tax) 
 
The second kind of climate tax is a measure based on the kind of energy that 
has been used in the production of a product. Even in this case, in order to 
assess the WTO compatibility of the PPM tax, the first step will be to undertake 
a comparison between two products. To stay with our example, is a tile 
produced in a factory that uses oil and coal as energy sources like another tile 
produced by a company that relies on solar energy? The tax is levied on the 
product, but the amount of the tax is based on elements that are not related to 
the products itself, but to its production. According to the traditional likeness 
criterion study, the two products have the same end uses; in fact, both tiles fulfill 
the same consumer demand. Furthermore, both have exactly the same physical 
properties and the same tariff classification. Consumer preferences is the only 
element of likeness that could determine that two goods are not like-products. 
There is only one fundamental question to be answered here: Do consumers 
consider a product produced with renewable energy differently compared to 
another that has been made with environmentally unfriendly energy? This is a 
case by case study that must be done in a specific market. It is probable that in 
very environmentally-concerned societies the way products are produced and 
their impact on climate change are very important for consumers. A special 
niche in the market may exist that may constitute an element in favor of 
defending the non-likeness of two products from a consumer perspective.23  
Since WTO case law has strongly affirmed that the likeness of two products 
should be decided in the marketplace,24 the possible differentiation between 
tiles based on the energy source used to produce them could be an important 
element. However, if consumers do not see two products as two different ways 
of satisfying their personal needs, then those two products will be alike for them. 
Thus, if consumers in a specific market do not consider two products 
differently on the basis of the energy used in their production, the two tiles will 
be like products, and the higher tax on the one produced with oil will be a 
violation of GATT article III. On the other hand, if the market analysis shows that 
consumers perceive the two tiles as two different products, then they will not be 
alike, and the higher tax on the tile based on the energy used in its production 
will be WTO compatible.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22  See ibid, p. 382. 
23  If people are starting to go to shops where just organic food is sold, that is because those 
consumers do not consider a genetically modified tomato like an organic tomato. Once this 
perception is established, the market reflects it and the two products become part of two 
different sectors. 
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24  Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Appellate Body Report, section H.2.a). 
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Table 2. Analysis of likeness for taxes based on the energy used in the 
production process 
Tile produced with polluting energy (oil) / Tile produced 
with less polluting energy (gas)
Like products 
End uses 9 
Consumer preferences 9/X 
Physical properties 9 
Tariff classification 9 
 
2.5. Taxes based on the energy efficiency of a product (efficiency tax) 
 
The last kind of climate taxes that have been underlined in this paper are 
energy efficiency related taxes. These depend on the environmental impact and, 
in particular, on the product’s contribution to climate change throughout its 
lifetime. This kind of tax is closely related to the previous tax – the PPM tax - 
which is based on the energy used in the production of a product that will not, 
per se, constitute a threat to climate change: i.e. a PPM. This kind of tax 
focuses rather on a product once it has already been produced: i.e. a car, a 
refrigerator, which may constitute a threat throughout its life. The tax, therefore, 
aims to reduce this threat by imposing a higher burden on those products that 
have a lower energy efficiency. 
 The first step in order to determine the WTO compatibility of the tax 
concerned is the determination of likeness between a car with a high energy 
efficiency and one with a lower energy efficiency. The analysis will be very 
similar to the one just undertaken for taxes based on the energy used in the 
production of a product. End uses will clearly be the same; two cars fulfill the 
same consumer demand. Tariff classification is the same also. However, in light 
of the importance given to fuel efficiency in automobile marketing and of the 
emphasis given to technical innovation in this domain one may assume that 
physical properties would be considered as being distinctly different. What 
about consumer preferences? The recent increases of the gasoline price have 
given added importance to this criterion in consumers’ purchasing decisions, 
and perspectives in this regard are not encouraging for cars with high gasoline 
consumption, not even in the U.S. Furthermore, car advertisements in some 
countries indicate the CO2 emission in g/km according to certain norms. 
Consumer preferences therefore point toward non-like products. In sum, only 
two of the four elements of the likeness exam tilt the decision in favor of 
considering cars with different energy efficiency as like products. Therefore, any 
tax on imported cars that is higher would presumably be relatively easy to justify 
under GATT Article III, following also the precedent of US – Car Taxe. 25  
 
                                                 
 10
25  Under the GATT dispute settlement system the European Communities brought a 
dispute against US legislation that differentiated between cars with higher energy efficiency 
(lower tax) and cars with lower energy efficiency (higher tax). According to the European 
Communities’ position “[A]ll automobiles were like products, because of their common 
physical characteristics, components and end-use”; see US – Automobiles, Panel Report, § 5.19. 
The Panel, following the above mentioned ‘aim and effect’ test, see above note 17, decided in 
favour of the US underlying the importance of the environmental goal of the measure; see ibid, 
§ 5.12, 5.13, 5.19, 5.20 and 5.24.  
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Table 3. Analysis of likeness for taxes based on the energy efficiency of a 
product 
car with high energy efficiency / car with low energy 
efficiency
like products 
End uses 9 
Consumer preferences X 
Physical properties X 
Tariff classification 9 
 
2.6. Conclusions on WTO compatibility of climate taxes per se 
 
The analysis of climate taxes within the framework of the national treatment 
principle provided for in GATT Article III leads to these provisional conclusions. 
Once two products that are differently taxed are considered like products, the 
tax will most likely be considered a violation of Article III. On the contrary, if the 
two products are deemed directly competitive or substitutable, there is more 
space for States to apply a climate tax without it being automatically WTO 
incompatible.  
Therefore, on the one hand, energy products, such as oil and coal, will 
probably fall within the second category and the final WTO compatibility of the 
tax on energy products (the feedstock tax) will depend on one further element: 
does the different taxation scheme on the two energy products lead to 
protection of the domestic product? On the other hand, taxes based on the 
energy used in the production process (the PPM tax) or on the energy efficiency 
of the final product (the efficiency tax) can be considered WTO compatible only 
through very environmentally friendly interpretations of the consumer’s 
preference criterion and of the physical properties criterion.  
 
 
3. Can climate taxes be justified under GATT article XX? 
 
GATT article XX establishes the general exceptions to the other GATT rules 
and, therefore, it also applies to article III. The protection of the environment in 
sensu latu is one of the non-commercial objectives that may legitimately be 
pursued through a measure that would otherwise be non-compatible with the 
multilateral trading system. Any tax that has been considered a violation of the 
national treatment can be saved by the general exception, if it meets the 
conditions provided for in GATT article XX.26  What does this provision say 
exactly? 
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26  In other words, GATT article XX allows some flexibility to States in the adoption of 
environmental taxes. However, O.K. Fauchald, “Flexibility and predictability under WTO's 
non-discrimination clauses”, 37.3 Journal of World Trade (2003), pp. 443-482, p. 451, 
maintains that: “… GATT Article XX can possibly provide some flexibility for environmental 
taxes that constitute implicit discrimination in violation of Article III. However, case-law has 
interpreted the exceptions restrictively. In view of the need for predictability when designing 
environmental taxes, it would in most cases not be acceptable to rely on invoking Article XX in 
order to justify such taxes.” 
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Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, 
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or 
enforcement by any contracting party of measures: 
 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if 
such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption; 
 
 In order to see whether a climate tax can be saved by article XX two 
questions must be posed:27  does the climate tax fall within one of the two 
paragraphs, b) or g)? If the first question is answered affirmatively, the second 
issue will be to see if the tax has been applied in a non-protectionist manner 
according to the article’s chapeau cited above.  
 
3.1. Is the tax a measure that deals with a legitimate non-commercial 
objective? 
 
The following questions must be asked in order to determine whether the 
climate tax falls within paragraph b) or g) of GATT Article XX.  
 Is the climate tax a measure that deals with the protection of human, 
animal or plant life and health? Or is it a measure that deals with the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources? In a way both questions, if 
answered positively, lead to the same conclusion: the measure fulfils an 
environmental purpose.  
The final goal of a climate tax is the protection of the environment. 
However, a State may prefer to link its measure to one paragraph or the other. 
If the tax is due to the protection of human, animal or plant health the measure 
must be necessary for achieving that goal. On the other hand, if the climate tax 
deals with the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, the measure must 
just be related to that goal. It is evident that the link in the second case is 
weaker and that it is much easier to prove than in the first case in which a State 
must deal with the burden of the necessity test.28  
 Therefore, due to the difference between the two kinds of environmental 
exceptions provided for in GATT Article XX, a State that adopts a climate tax 
may wish to clearly state that its final objective is, if not solely, also to conserve 
exhaustible natural resources. However, vis a vis a WTO complaint, the State 
will also have to show that national measures are “made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption”. If the real goal of the 
                                                 
27  United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 
Appellate Body Report (Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996), section IV, and United States - 
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (US – Shrimp), Appellate Body 
Report (WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998), § 119-120. 
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28  The difference between necessary and related to has been underlined already in the old 
GATT dispute settlement system; Canada — Measures affecting exports of unprocessed herring 
and salmon, Panel Report (Doc. L/6268 - 35S/98, 22 March 1988), § 4.6. 
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tax is to tackle climate change this should not be a problem, because non-
environmentally friendly practices will lead to serious threats to climate change 
wherever they come from. However, in some cases this requirement can 
become a drawback for some countries in their climate policies strategies.  
 To sum up, the first step in examining GATT Article XX concerns the 
content of the tax measure. The overall goal is to see whether the State has 
adopted a measure that falls within one of the non-commercial objectives that 
may allow legitimate exceptions. On the one hand, if the climate tax deals with 
the protection of human, animal or plant health, one must determine whether 
the climate tax is necessary. On the other hand, if the climate tax deals with the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, one must assess whether the 
climate tax is related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and if 
the climate tax is applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production 
or consumption. 
 
3.2. Is a climate tax applied in a non-protectionist manner? 
 
The content of a climate tax may be considered legitimate but there is a second 
overall condition that the measure must fulfill: the tax must not be applied in a 
protectionist manner. There are three requirements that must be met in order 
for a tax to be applied in a non-protectionist manner: the measure must not be 
an arbitrary discrimination, and it must not be an unjustifiable discrimination. 
Finally, the measure must not be a disguised restriction on international trade. 
All three requirements refer to situations that occur between countries where 
the same conditions prevail. 
 The following sections of this paper will analyze whether the content and 
the application of the three above-mentioned climate taxes can be justified 
according to GATT Article XX. 
 
3.3. Can climate taxes on energy products be justified  
       under GATT article XX? 
 
Once a climate tax on energy products has been considered a violation of 
article III, one must see if the measure can be saved by the general exception 
under GATT Article XX.29 The first question will be to see whether the content 
of the climate tax falls within one of the categories that justify otherwise non-
compatible WTO measures.  
 
3.3.1. Feedstock tax & paragraph b) 
 
Is the feedstock tax necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant 
health? The issue here is twofold. The question is whether climate change is a 
threat to human, animal or plant health. Some of the problems associated with 
climate change are precisely its negative effects on human health,30 as well as 
                                                 
29  S. Zarrilli deals with this issue in S. Zarrilli, above n. 19, pp. 383-388. 
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30  Climate change is responsible for the increase in malaria due to higher temperatures and 
to the spread of mosquitoes in larger parts of the world. Furthermore, desertification caused by 
climate change leads to more droughts which lead to human health problems. See Summary for 
Policymakers. Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, A Report of 
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on the animals’ and the plants’. However, even if climate change is related to 
health problems, is the tax measure really necessary to solve these problems? 
The linkage between the measure and the non-commercial purpose must be 
very strong in this case. The necessity test in GATT article XX b) has been 
subject to many criticisms in the past because panels and the Appellate Body 
interpreted it very restrictively through the least trade restrictive test. According 
to this approach, the State applying the tax had to prove that there was no other 
possible measure, which would have been less restrictive of international trade 
than the one actually adopted.31 Case law has evolved and now the necessity 
test has developed into something closer to a proportionality test. 32  The 
interpreter must balance the negative effects on international trade with two 
important factors: the nature of the non-commercial interest pursued by the 
measure and the role of the measure in fulfilling such a goal.33 Therefore, the 
final questions are whether climate change is a vital interest and if the tax 
measure is essential to combat climate change. 
If one is truly concerned by climate change, then his/her interpretation is 
that solving current negative climate change trends is vital for mankind and, 
therefore, for the international community. A feedstock tax is an instrument 
whose goal is to promote less polluting kinds of energy products. Thus, in view 
of the importance of energy in the overall climate change problem, a tax on 
energy products is crucial for an efficient climate policy.34  
However, it must be recalled that not all States agree on the dangers of 
climate change and some would argue against the efficiency of taxes on energy 
products. Probably, in a case before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
scientific expertise would be of great relevance in order to assess how 
important climate change really is. In such a case IPCC reports must be 
considered as an important element of proof in favor of those countries that 
defend measures taken in order to tackle climate change. 
 
3.3.2. Feedstock tax & paragraph g)  
 
What would happen if a State that has adopted a tax on energy products 
decides to defend itself on the grounds of paragraph g), instead of arguing 
under b)? Is the climate tax measure related to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources? In this case the examination will be threefold.  
                                                                                                                                               
Working Group II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2001), § 3.5, available at 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/vol4/english/pdf/wg2spm.pdf.  
31  The least trade restrictive test posed a very heavy burden on those States that decided to 
adopt non-commercial policies that could enter into conflict with the multilateral trading system. 
See United States - Section 337 of the tariff act of 1930, Panel Report (Doc. L/6439, 16 January 
1989), § 5.26; and Thailand – Cigarettes, Panel Report Doc. DS10/R - 37S/200, 7 November 
1990, § 75. 
32  J. Wiers, Trade and Environment in the EC and in the WTO. A Legal Analysis: 
Groningen; Europa Law Publishing (2002), p. 242 compares it with the proportionality principle 
present in the EC Treaty, art. 30. 
33  In other words, the more important, more vital, the interest that is being pursued by the 
measure is, the more likely will it be to be necessary. Likewise, if the tax is a crucial measure 
for the State’s efforts in relation to the vital non-commercial interest, it is more likely to be 
necessary. See Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, 
Appellate Body Report (Doc.WT/DS161/AB/R, 11 December 2000), § 164. 
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34  See S. Zarrilli, above n. 19, p. 385. 
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The first question is to see whether climate change affects exhaustible 
natural resources. The main cause of climate change is the increase of 
greenhouse gases, and particularly of carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere that 
absorb the solar infrared radiation that has been reflected by the earth’s surface. 
This radiation is re-emitted to the earth causing the warming of the earth’s 
surface and of the troposphere. If the atmosphere itself is a natural resource, 
then climate change is responsible for its deterioration. If this possible 
interpretation should fail to convince some critics of climate change, then one 
could look at WTO case law for guidance. In US - Reformulated Gasoline clean 
air was considered an exhaustible natural resource. Some authors consider that, 
if this is the case, the concept of clean air can be widened meaning that the 
dangerous levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere constitute a threat to 
an exhaustible natural resource.35  
 The second question is to determine whether the tax on energy products 
is related to the non-commercial goal. In this case, does a feedstock tax relate 
to climate change efforts, considered as measures whose goal is to promote the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources? In this case WTO jurisprudence 
has developed a reasonableness test according to which the second 
requirement in GATT Article XX g) will be met if there is a reasonable 
relationship between the means (in this case the energy product tax) and the 
end (tackling climate change).36 The reasonableness test will be easier to meet 
than the necessity test in paragraph b). A feedstock tax is clearly related to the 
goal it intends to pursue, which is to promote cleaner kinds of energies. This 
instrument is clearly related to the overall end, which is to tackle climate change 
caused to a great extent by non-environmentally friendly energy sources like oil.  
 Finally, there is a third condition that must be met in order for taxes on 
energy products to be considered compatible with GATT article XX g). The tax 
must be applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption. This makes sense from an environmental perspective and it 
places an obligation of impartiality upon the State that adopts the tax.37 If oil is a 
problem for climate change, where it comes from does not make any difference. 
However, this third requirement may be a big problem for many States that wish 
to defend their climate taxes on energy products. In fact, most industrialized 
States tax non-environmentally friendly energy products heavily but, at the 
same time, subsidize domestic production of the same energy product.38  
Oil is a perfect example. On the one hand, it is heavily taxed but, on the 
other hand, national refineries are being helped economically and more funding 
is provided in order to discover new, and maybe the last, oil deposits. States 
                                                 
35  See J. Wiers, above n. 32, p. 239. 
36  US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, § 141. 
37  US –Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, section III.C; US – Shrimp, Appellate Body 
Report, § 144-145. 
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38  Furthermore, this practice goes against Kyoto Protocol Article 2.1.a) v) that calls for the 
elimination of all market based instruments that run against the objectives of the protocol: 
“Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall [I]mplement 
and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances, 
such as: [P]rogressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax 
and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the 
objective of the Convention…” 
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might be able to defend their awkward position before their voters, but it will be 
much more difficult to convince the WTO DSB that the tax on energy products 
has been applied in conjunction with domestic efforts, if imported oil is being 
taxed while oil exploration or processing is being subsidized domestically.39  
 In conclusion, should this be the case, a feedstock tax will not be 
compatible with the multilateral trading system and it will not be saved by the 
general exceptions provided for in GATT article XX, if the adopting State 
decides to argue under paragraph g). Should the climate tax be defended under 
paragraph b), however the measure might stand more chances of being saved 
as an exception to the multilateral trading system.  
 
Table 4. Energy products and GATT article XX 
Feedstock tax and GATT article XX General criterion  
Does the tax deal with human, animal 
or plant health? 
Is climate change a threat for 
human, animal or plant health? 
9 
Is the tax necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant health? 
Is climate change a vital interest? 9 
 Is the tax measure essential to 
solve climate change? 
9/X 
Is a tax measure related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources? 
Is climate change about 
exhaustible natural resources? 
9 
 Is there a reasonable means-end 
relationship between the energy 
products tax and climate 
change? 
9 
 Is the energy products tax 
applied in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption 
X 
 
 In the latter case the second phase of the analysis of GATT article XX 
would be carried out and one must see whether the tax on energy products has 
been applied in a non-protectionist manner. The same reason why the measure 
would not meet the requirements in paragraph g) will probably also determine 
the non-compatibility of the tax with the chapeau. 40  The fact that imported 
polluting energy products are taxed, while, at the same time, they are 
domestically subsidized, constitutes clear proof of the protectionist nature of the 
measure.  
Therefore, if States do not stop funding domestically those same energy 
products that are heavily taxed when they are imported because of their 
allegedly negative contribution to climate change, it will be very difficult to 
defend taxes on energy products before the WTO DSB.41  
                                                 
39  See S. Zarrilli, above n. 19,, p. 387. 
40  This is also the same reason that leads one to consider that the oil tax gives less 
favourable treatment to imported energy products and, therefore, constitutes a violation of 
GATT Article III.2; vid. supra section 2.3. 
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41  See S. Zarrilli’s conclusion on the relationship between taxes on energy products and 
the WTO in S. Zarrilli, above n. 19, p. 388. 
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3.4. Can climate taxes based on the kind of energy used in the production 
process be justified under GATT article XX? 
 
A PPM tax is based on the energy used in the production of the product. The 
tax will most likely be considered a violation of GATT article III and it must be 
seen if it can be saved as an environmental exception under GATT article XX. 
The procedure will be very similar to the one described above in relation to the 
feedstock tax. Two different phases must be carried out: the first in which the 
content of the measure will be analyzed, and the second in which the goal is to 
determine whether the tax has been applied correctly.  
 
3.4.1. The PPM tax & paragraphs b) or g) 
 
In the first phase the aim is to see whether the objective of the measure falls 
under one of the legitimate non-commercial goals provided for in GATT article 
XX and to evaluate whether a State stands better chances under paragraph b) 
or g). This is very important for strategic purposes; in fact, should a State decide 
to argue under paragraph b), two questions must be answered: does the PPM 
tax deal with the protection of human, animal or plant health? and is the tax 
necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant health? 
The objective of the tax will be to tackle climate change through the 
promotion of those products that have been produced with cleaner energy 
sources. The primary objective is not the protection of human, animal or plant 
health but, if one agrees that climate change is responsible for problems in 
these fields, then a measure that deals with climate change also deals with the 
protection of human, animal or plant health.  
The second question will be more difficult to answer in a straightforward 
manner. Taking the position that climate change is a vital interest, it is 
debatable whether the PPM tax is the least trade restrictive measure that could 
have been adopted. Still, one has to remember that WTO case law has evolved 
and that now a proportionality test must be carried out in order to see whether a 
measure is or is not necessary under paragraph b). Against this background, 
one can argue that the PPM tax is very important for efficient climate policies 
because if one cannot intervene on the way products are being produced, if this 
contributes negatively to current climate change trends, then the correspondent 
climate policy will be flawed. However, it must be underlined that the necessity 
test, even if not as strict as it once was, will still be a very hard obstacle for 
climate taxes based on the energy used in the production methods.  
 Therefore, it would be wise to switch a States’ defense to paragraph g) 
where three conditions must be fulfilled: the tax must deal with exhaustible 
natural resources; the tax must be related to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources; and, finally, the tax must be applied in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption 
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Following the previously discussed position in relation to the feedstock 
tax, the PPM tax deals with the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
Is there a reasonable relation between means and ends? Even in this case 
such a relation exists because of the relevance of energy for climate change. It 
is not only the energy product per se that causes climate change, but its use in 
the manufacture of a product, such as a tile, is equally responsible for current 
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negative climate change trends. Finally, if States treat domestic and imported 
products in the same way with regard to the energy used in their production, the 
third requirement provided for in paragraph g) will be fulfilled and the content of 
the tax measure will be compatible with the WTO. 
 
3.4.2. The PPM tax & the chapeau of GATT article XX  
 
The second phase of the GATT Article XX exam must be carried out in order to 
see if the application of the measure leads to protectionism. Three requirements 
must be fulfilled in order for a climate tax to be non-protectionist:42 the measure 
must not be an arbitrary discrimination; it must not be an unjustifiable 
discrimination; and the measure must not be a disguised restriction on 
international trade. 
According to the case law elaborated especially in Shrimp-Turtle the first 
two requirements can usually be assessed together and combined in one 
analysis.43 Arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination will be present if the tax 
measure lacks flexibility in its application and if the tax measure has been 
adopted without prior negotiation efforts to deal with the issue bilaterally or 
multilaterally. 
Concerning flexibility the DSB in US-Shrimp denounced the US measure 
because it gave more time and possibilities to some countries compared to 
others.44 The ratio of the flexibility requirement is clear from an environmental 
perspective. If a PPM elaborated through a polluting energy source is produced 
in Spain or in China, the impact on climate change will be the same. Therefore, 
if Spain gives more time to India than to China to adjust its production process, 
this can reveal arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination. Therefore, in order for a 
measure, such as a PPM tax, to be considered WTO compatible, flexibility must 
be given to all other parties. Another element of the flexibility criterion is the fact 
that a State must not oblige another State to follow its production methods in 
exactly the same way. In many cases this would be impossible, especially for 
developing countries, and it would imply a protectionist measure. A comparable 
measure approach is preferred by panels and the Appellate Body.45 If a State is 
concerned about climate change and adopts a PPM tax, it should allow imports 
from other countries that have adopted a comparable measure.  
In sum, if the real goal behind a PPM tax is to tackle climate change, the 
first condition of the flexibility test should be easily met because there is no 
environmental reason to treat countries differently. However, if that is the case, 
then the tax measure constitutes a clear example of arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination. The second element of the flexibility test leaves more space to 
discretion since states can have different feelings about what is comparable. 
There is no clear-cut answer and the decision must be taken on a case by case 
approach. 
                                                 
42  US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, § 150, and United States - Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia (US – 
Shrimp, art. 21.5 DSU), Appellate Body Report (Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW, 22 October 2001), § 
118. 
43  US – Shrimp, Appellate Body Report, § 177. 
44  Ibid, § 173-175. 
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45  Ibid, § 163. 
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 The second criterion that must be used in order to see whether a 
measure constitutes an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination is the presence 
of negotiation efforts. In the Shrimp-Turtle case the US measure was deemed 
WTO incompatible because the US had not started serious talks with the other 
parties affected by its measures in order to deal with the environmental issue.46  
 The presence of a negotiation effort may be revealed by the status of the 
PPM tax within the international climate change regime. Kyoto Protocol Article 2 
establishes a list of policies that Parties may want to take into account for their 
domestic climate policies.47 Taxes are part of the list.48 Does this imply any 
legal consequence in relation to the study of the WTO compatibility of a tax 
measure adopted in order to tackle climate change? According to some States, 
if a trade measure is provided for in a Multilateral Environmental Agreement 
(MEA), this could override a provision of the WTO. 49  However, the trade 
measure must be specific, in the sense that it must be clearly provided for in the 
MEA and Parties must be obliged to adopt it in their environmental policies. 
Furthermore, a specific trade measure will prevail over a WTO rule only if the 
Party affected by the trade measure is also Party to the MEA.50 Therefore, there 
are two main limits to consider when analyzing the fact that taxes are included 
in the list of possible climate policies of Kyoto Protocol article 2. First, the tax is 
not a specific trade measure. However, some countries maintain a different 
position on this point and conclude that even those trade measures which are 
just recommended by an MEA can prevail over WTO rules.51 Second, the trade-
specific argument would not be of any help in case the tax affects a non-Party 
to the Kyoto Protocol.  
                                                 
46  Ibid, § 172. 
47  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Kyoto, 10 December 1997, in force 16 February 2005, 37 ILM (1998), at 22, art. 2.1.a): “Each 
Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall: (a) 
Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national 
circumstances, such as…” (Emphasis added). 
48  Ibid: art. 2.1.a.(v) “Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal 
incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run 
counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market instruments;” (Emphasis 
added). 
49  Doc. TN/TE/W/43, Committee on Trade and Environment - Special Session - Statement 
by Colombia on the Relationship Between Existing WTO Rules and Specific Trade Obligations 
(STOs) set out in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAS) - Statement by Colombia in 
the Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session at its Meeting of 22 June 2004 - 
Paragraph 31(i), § 5; Doc. TN/TE/W/2, Committee on Trade and Environment - Special Session 
- Mandate under Paragraph 31(i) of the Doha Declaration on Trade and Environment - 
Submission by the Argentine Republic - Paragraph 31(i); Doc. TN/TE/W/23 , Committee on 
Trade and Environment - Special Session - Relationship between Specific Trade Obligations set 
out in MEAs and WTO Rules - Submission by India - Paragraph 31(i); Dc. TN/TE/W/35, 
Committee on Trade and Environment - Special Session - Identification of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and Specific Trade Obligations (STOs) - Submission by 
China - Paragraph 31(i), § 5. 
50  Doha Ministerial Declaration (Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/120, 14 November 2001), § 
31.i.  
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51  See Doc. TN/TE/W/1, Committee on Trade and Environment - Special Session - 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAS): Implementation of the Doha Development 
Agenda - Submission by the European Communities - Paragraph 31(i), § 25. 
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Despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol might not be decisive in the final 
decision, it does have some relevance. If a State maintains that the tax on 
products based on the energy used in their production is part of their domestic 
climate efforts provided for in the Kyoto Protocol, this must be taken into 
account as an element of proof in relation to the negotiation effort criterion. The 
tax is not a unilateral measure taken without any international coordination. The 
PPM tax will be part of a more comprehensive approach based on a global 
MEA. Furthermore, if the measure has a negative effect on trade flows from a 
non-Party to the Kyoto Protocol, the efforts of the State that is applying the 
measure to bring the reluctant State back on board of the MEA can also be an 
element of proof of serious negotiations between the parties involved in the 
dispute. Case law has clarified that negotiations must be started, but not 
concluded, before adopting a trade restrictive measure.52 Therefore, once the 
State that is adopting the tax demonstrates that negotiations with the non-Party 
are ongoing, there is no reason why that State cannot apply a tax that 
negatively affects the trade interests of a non-Party of the Kyoto Protocol.  
 The third requirement that must be fulfilled in order for a measure to be 
considered non-protectionist and, therefore, finally compatible with the WTO 
regime is that it must not constitute a disguised restriction of international trade. 
The chapeau of GATT article XX is about the application of a specific measure. 
The PPM tax can fulfill a legitimate environmental objective, its application 
might be flexible enough and the correct dialogue with the affected country has 
been proved. Even in a case like this, the measure can still constitute a 
disguised restriction of international trade. What reveals such a nature? The 
design, architecture and internal structure of a tax measure will reveal its 
protectionist nature.53 Therefore, in order for a climate tax not to be denounced 
by the WTO regime, States must be very careful at the moment of writing the 
piece of legislation. The clearer the tax measure, the less space for ambiguity 
and discretion will there be. The design of a measure will reveal a disguised 
restriction on international trade if it shows a procedure with too many steps 
and/or unnecessary bureaucratic requirements. However, no matter how clear a 
State writes its law, the affected country will always consider that its design, 
architecture and internal structure affects its trade interests negatively and that 
it reveals an unlawful application. As in other steps in the examination of the 
GATT article XX, the final decision must be taken on a case by case approach.  
 
Table 5. Taxes based on the kind of energy used in the production and GATT 
article XX 
PPM tax and GATT article XX General criterion  
Does the tax deal with human, animal 
or plant health? 
Is climate change a threat for 
human, animal or plant health? 
9 
Is the tax necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant health? 
Is climate change a vital interest? 9 
 Is the tax measure essential to 
solve climate change? 
9/X 
Is the tax measure related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural 
Is climate change about 
exhaustible natural resources? 
9 
                                                 
52  US – Shrimp, art. 21.5 DSU, Appellate Body Report, § 122-123. 
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53  EC – Asbestos, Panel Report, § 8.236. 
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resources? 
 Is there a reasonable means-end 
relationship between the energy 
products tax and climate 
change? 
9 
 Is the energy products tax 
applied in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption 
9 
The tax is not an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination 
Does the tax allow for sufficient 
flexibility? 
Are all States treated equally 
(comparable approach)? 
9/X 
 Have serious negotiations been 
established with the affected 
country? 
9 
The tax is not a disguised restriction 
of international trade 
Design, architecture and 
structure of the tax  
9/X 
 
 
3.5. Can climate taxes based on energy efficiency be justified under GATT 
article XX?  
 
An efficiency tax is based on the energy efficiency of a product and, therefore, it 
relates to the environmental conduct of a product throughout its lifetime. As in 
the PPM case, it is very likely that a tax of this nature will be considered a 
violation of GATT article III and one must see whether it can be saved under the 
environmental exceptions of article XX. 
  
3.5.1. Efficiency tax & paragraph b) or g) 
 
A tax based on the energy efficiency of a product can, according to a specific 
interpretation, affect the physical properties of a product making it safer for 
human health.54 If one agrees with this conclusion, the linkage between the tax 
measure and the protection of human, animal and plant health will be more 
easily assessed. As in the PPM tax, the necessity requirement, even in the 
milder version of the proportionality test, will not be easy to fulfill for the State 
adopting the energy efficiency related tax.  
 Even in this case, a State will probably be better off if it chooses to 
defend its tax under paragraph g). An efficiency tax deals with the conservation 
of exhaustible natural resources and there is a reasonable relationship between 
means and ends. A tax based on energy efficiency standards aims to reduce 
carbon dioxide emissions, which are the main cause of current negative climate 
change trends. If the tax is adopted as part of a genuine environmental policy, 
the same tax will be levied on domestic products and, therefore, the measure 
will be applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production and 
consumption, as required by paragraph g). 
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54  See above section 2.5. 
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3.5.2. Efficiency tax & the chapeau of article XX 
 
Once demonstrated that the content of the efficiency tax is legitimate, one must 
turn to its application. Does it constitute an arbitrary and unjustifiable 
discrimination? The same arguments presented for the PPM tax apply in this 
case. Flexibility in relation to products from other countries should not be a 
problem, if the tax responds to a true climate change concern. Flexibility in 
relation to the characteristics of the foreign measure related to energy efficiency 
leaves more space to discretion and it will probably be an element of discussion 
among the parties involved in the conflict. As clarified above, the DSB will 
decide on a case by case basis whether the imports are allowed. The fact that 
the State adopting an efficiency tax accepts comparable measures and does 
not require identical measures will be an element in favor of its climate policy.  
The negotiation effort criterion will lead to the same conclusions as for 
the PPM tax. Depending on the position taken in the Dispute Settlement Body 
(debate on trade measures in MEAs and their relationship with the WTO), one 
will give more or less importance to the presence of tax measures in Kyoto 
Protocol article 2. As maintained before, if a State clearly states that the 
measure is part of its domestic climate commitments provided for by the 
international climate change regime, this must be taken into account in the 
assessment of the fulfillment of the negotiation criterion. 
Finally, is the tax measure a disguised restriction on international trade? 
Once again, the design, architecture and internal structure of the tax measure 
will reveal its nature. Just as in the case of the PPM tax, there is no clear-cut 
answer and the DSB will have to undertake a careful analysis of the tax 
measure to see whether its application leads to unlawful protectionism or not.  
 
Table 6. Taxes based on energy efficiency and GATT article XX  
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Efficiency tax and GATT article XX General criterion  
Does the tax deal with human, animal 
or plant health? 
Is energy efficiency important for 
human, animal or plant health? 
9/X 
Is the tax necessary for the protection 
of human, animal or plant health? 
Is climate change a vital interest? 9 
 Is the tax measure essential to 
solve climate change? 
9/X 
Is the tax measure related to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources? 
Is climate change about 
exhaustible natural resources? 
9 
 Is there a reasonable means-end 
relationship between the energy 
products tax and climate 
change? 
9 
 Is the energy products tax 
applied in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption 
9 
The tax is not an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination 
Does the tax allow for sufficient 
flexibility? 
9/X 
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Have serious negotiations been 
established with the affected 
country? 
 
9 
The tax is not a disguised restriction 
of international trade 
Design, architecture and 
structure of the tax 
9/X 
 
 
4. Conclusion   
 
The analysis of the compatibility of climate taxes with the multilateral trading 
system enables us to draw the following legal conclusions, which will then lead 
to present some policy recommendations whose goal is to help bridge the 
current gap between climate taxes and the multilateral trading system. 
Firstly, it is very likely that all three taxes will be considered a violation of 
the national treatment provided for in GATT article III. Energy products will be 
considered directly competitive and substitutable products, which leaves more 
space to domestic regulation, but current State aid practices connected with 
domestic non-environmentally friendly energy products will lead a Panel to 
consider that less favorable treatment is given to the imported energy product. 
Despite the possibility of considering them as non-like products, based on the 
energy used in their production or on their energy efficiency, when very 
environmentally friendly interpretations are used, it is wiser to think that the two 
will be considered like products, and that any slight difference in taxation in 
favor of the domestic product will result in a violation of the national treatment 
principle. 
Secondly, the feedstock tax will probably not be saved under GATT 
article XX general exceptions, if the tax is not applied in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production. Once again, the fact that a State acts one 
way with imported products, and in the opposite in relation to its own products, 
is not compatible with the spirit of the multilateral trading system. 
Thirdly, a State must decide its strategy under article XX and it can 
decide to either go for paragraph b) or g). If a State treats imported and 
domestic products equally, paragraph g) will be a better choice both for a PPM 
tax and for an efficiency tax. All three requirements therein are easier to fulfill 
than the ones provided for in paragraph b) in which the necessity test still 
leaves too much space to discretion, despite its recent evolution.  
Fourth, the analysis of the application of a climate tax is usually made 
when an environmental measure is considered non-WTO compatible, and if it 
leads to protectionism. One of the criteria to determine whether the measure is 
or is not an arbitrary discrimination is the negotiation effort criterion and the 
Kyoto Protocol has a positive role to play in the assessment thereof. 
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Fifth, two variables may lead to a negative solution for the State adopting 
the climate tax within the chapeau of GATT article XX. On the one hand, the 
flexibility requirement, and particularly the obligation that the foreign measure 
must be comparable and not identical to the domestic climate tax, can in most 
cases be strongly criticized by the affected country. The same can be said for 
the study of the design, architecture and internal structure of the climate tax, 
which will reveal whether the measure is a disguised restriction on international 
trade. The difficulty lies in the fact that in both cases the criteria are very 
subjective and there is no previous standard to follow.  
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The legal conclusions of this paper lead to five main policy 
recommendations that may help to bridge the current gap between climate 
taxes and the multilateral trading system: 
1) States must refrain from subsidizing and helping domestic non-
environmentally friendly energy products while doing the opposite with imported 
energy sources; 
2) States must clearly state that the objective of their climate tax is the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources and they must explain the relation 
between the objective pursued by the measure and the role of the tax in 
achieving it. This will give a State more legal grounds, should it find itself 
defending the climate tax before a WTO panel under article XX, paragraph g); 
3) States must maintain that their climate tax is part of the domestic efforts 
provided for in Kyoto Protocol article 2.1. This will be useful in a WTO dispute in 
order to prove the fulfillment of the negotiation effort criterion present in the 
chapeau of GATT article XX; 
4) States must be flexible in the application of climate taxes. On the one hand, 
a State should allow imports from countries that take climate change seriously 
and that are developing comparable measures. On the other hand, if the 
country that is adopting the climate tax is an industrialized country, the flexibility 
requirement could imply that technology transfer should be provided to 
developing countries that lack the material possibilities to deal with climate 
change in the same way industrialized countries do; 
5) Finally, States must be very careful at the moment of drafting a climate tax. 
The measure must be very clear and not leave any space for possible ambiguity. 
Furthermore, there must not be an excessive burden on the importing country in 
relation to bureaucracy and procedural aspects, for example. An approach of 
this kind will be more useful at the moment of defending itself against a State 
that considers the climate tax a disguised restriction on international trade. 
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